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Deception is an inevitable component of human interaction. Researchers and practitioners are developing infor-
mation systems to aid in the detection of deceptive communication. Information systems are typically adopted by
end users to aid in completing a goal or objective (e.g., increasing the efficiency of a business process). However,
end-user interactionswith deception detection systems (adversarial systems) are unique because the goals of the
system and the user are orthogonal. Prior work investigating systems-based deception detection has focused on
the identification of reliable deception indicators. This research extends extant work by looking at how users of
deception detection systems alter their behavior in response to the presence of guilty knowledge, relevant
stimuli, and system knowledge. An analysis of data collected during two laboratory experiments reveals that
guilty knowledge, relevant stimuli, and system knowledge all lead to increased use of countermeasures. The
implications and limitations of this research are discussed and avenues for future research are outlined.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
A vital consideration of information systems research is the growing
use of mandatory systems. These systems have the capacity to measure
user behavior without the express consent or instigation of the user.
Traditional technology adoption research has been conducted from
theperspective that use is voluntary and focused on a reward or positive
outcome for the user. Primarily, this research has focused on systems
interaction contexts in which users want to use the system to help
them accomplish certain tasks, or make them more effective in their
work [1–3]. Prior efforts have focused on user perceptions of system
usefulness, ease of use, job relevance, image, output quality, computer
self-efficacy, perception of external control, computer playfulness,
enjoyment, and usability [4]. Most system interactions today are of
this type—voluntary and reward-focused [5,6]. While some research
has looked at the involuntary adoption of systems, the outcome was
still focused on task effectiveness and the ability of the system to
improve overall organizational effectiveness [7,8]. However, many of
these factors are not relevant to interactions with systems in which
the interaction is compulsory (e.g., a full-body scanner at an airport),
and could result in a punitive outcome for the user (e.g., being detained
at the airport). Systems of this nature, hereafter referred to as adversarial
systems, introduce a new context of research where users are placed in
situations in which they must interact with the system, have no control
over the data that are collected, and could be subject to a punitive
outcome (see Table 1 for definitions of key terms used in this paper).
Deception detection is one context in which a user and a system
may beworking in opposition [9]. In this context, the human–computer
interaction principle of a system supporting the user—or the system
and user complementing one another [13]—is violated. Traditional
computer-aided deception detection often includes the use of a poly-
graph device coupled with accompanying sensors to aid in determining
the veracity of a person's statements. A polygraph device requires the
direct measurement of a person's heart rate, skin conductance, respira-
tion, and blood pressure by a trained polygraph examiner [14]. This
process is expensive, obtrusive, and not easily scalable to a large number
of interactions. A growing body of information systems research
addresses the development of computing devices that will permit
deception detection to be automated, unobtrusive, cost effective, and
potentially more accurate and scientifically valid [15–20]. A system
capable of conducting automated deception detection interviews has
the potential to be utilized in any number of government or organiza-
tional contexts and applications. These include employment screening
and the identification of insider security threats, a key concern of infor-
mation security researchers [21–25]. Despite recent progress in the
development of deception detection systems, several elements of
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users' interactions with such systems have yet to be investigated.
Specifically, three key areas related to user behavior with adversarial
systems that information systems researchers have yet to address
include: (1) the impact of guilty knowledge, (2) the impact of relevant
stimuli being presented during the interaction and (3) the impact of
increasing a user's knowledge about the system.
First, deceptive users working to avoid detection by a deception de-
tection systemwould perceive the system to be adversarial. According-
ly, users would likely attempt to mitigate the system's effectiveness by
altering their behavior to appear innocent. Actions taken to mitigate
the effectiveness of a detection system are called countermeasures.
The practice of using countermeasures to appear innocent has been
witnessed and studied extensively in polygraph examinations [26].
Extant work on countermeasures has been limited to the investigation
of (a) countermeasures employed against the polygraph [27], and
(b) the impact of traditional polygraph countermeasures on newly
developed information systems designed to detect deception [9]. Most
deception indicators targeted by new deception systems are different
from those targeted by the polygraph; accordingly, researchers must
explore novel ways in which users will manipulate their behavior to
appear truthful.
Second, all forms of deception detection interactions require the
selection of questions or stimuli that will elicit deception indicators
from users. Even the most valid deception interaction formats can be
difficult to administer due to limitations in selecting relevant
questions/stimuli to be used during the interaction [28]. Research is
needed to explore how a lack of relevant stimuli during a deception de-
tection interaction will influence countermeasure use.
Third, deception researchers developing new systems often conduct
studies in which participants have no concept of the purpose of the sys-
temor any concept of its operations [15–17]. This limits ecological valid-
ity as real-world users—especially those with a vested interest in
deceiving the system—would have a substantial amount of knowledge
about the functionality of a real-world system when it is deployed for
use. We see this currently with the polygraph, with widely available re-
sources teaching how to “beat” a polygraph examination. Understand-
ing how increased system knowledge will affect countermeasure use
warrants further investigation.
This research investigates variations in behavior that occur
when users interact with an adversarial deception detection system.
These variations are manifested as countermeasures. The use of
countermeasures is predicted to vary in response to the following
three manipulations: (1) the presence or lack of guilty knowledge in
system users, (2) the system's inclusion or omission of relevant stimuli
during the interaction, and (3) the user being aware or unaware of the
capabilities/functionality of the system. This research contributes to
existing knowledge by demonstrating that there are substantial differ-
ences in the way users interact with adversarial deception detection
systemsbased on a presence or lack of: guilty knowledge, relevant stim-
uli, and system knowledge. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. First, we discuss relevant literature. Next, we specify hypothe-
ses based on relevant theory. Third, we outline the methodology used
for two data collections. Fourth, we provide an analysis of the data
and discuss the implications of ourwork. Finally, we present limitations
and avenues for future research.
2. Literature review
We have identified countermeasures as a strategy that users can
employ to mitigate the accuracy of adversarial deception detection sys-
tems. We now examine the use of adversarial deception detection sys-
tems by drawing from three key areas of literature: technology
acceptance and adversarial systems, automated deception detection
systems, and deception countermeasures.
2.1. Technology acceptance and adversarial systems
One of the most widely studied theoretical models in the field of in-
formation systems is the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [29].
This model attempts to predict system adoption by measuring a
system's perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use [6]. Evaluations
of a variety of system types have used the TAMmodel to predict system
adoption, including email, ecommerce, and executive information sys-
tems [4,30,31]. Fundamentally, TAM suggests that a user will adopt a
system if it enhances his or her job performance, and that using it will
be free of effort [2]. TAM has been an effective theoretical model for
studying adoption of systems used in the workplace that attempt to
increase productivity, effectiveness, or produce a positive outcome.
However, TAM may not be useful for understanding the adoption
and use of new types of systems,whichwe have termed adversarial sys-
tems. For example, a user may be required to submit to a polygraph
examination as part of the pre-employment screening process with a
new employer [32,33]. Interacting with this system would be compul-
sory and not directly related to the work the prospective employee
will be doing. It is also unlikely that interactingwith a polygraph system
will affect long-term job performance after being hired. Users have very
little control over the examination process, structure, or the data that
are collected [14,34].
The ways users interact with adversarial systems are fundamentally
different from the ways users interact with traditional information sys-
tems. Instead of wanting to use the system to improve their own pro-
ductivity, users may choose to actively work against the adversarial
system. This shift in users' perceptions of such systems requires a new
theoretical understanding of howuserswill interactwith these systems.
For example, Venkatesh and Bala [4] found that user experience had a
moderating effect on the relationships between perceived ease of use
on behavioral intention, and perceived ease of use on perceived useful-
ness. However, within the context of an adversarial system, there is no
system adoption. The behavioral intention may be to circumvent the
system, not use the system. Insufficient theoretical development has
been done to understand how increasing experience may affect the
way users interact with adversarial systems. In fact, due to the funda-
mentally different nature of adversarial systems, an entirely new theo-
retical framework of systems use may be warranted. The findings
presented herein can be used to guide the future development of such
a framework.
2.2. Automated deception detection systems
Deception is a persisting element of interpersonal communication.
However, detecting deception is notoriously difficult for humans. Reli-
able deception identification rates hover around 54% [35]. Innovators
have long sought information systems that can be used to augment or
replace the human element in this interaction context. The polygraph
is the most widely recognized and used technology for veracity assess-
ments. Despite decades of empirical research and extensive laboratory
and field testing, its validity and accuracy remain a point of uncertainty
and debate [36–38]. Exacerbating the questionable utility of polygraph
use is a problem of scalability. Traditional polygraph interviews require
Table 1
Term definitions.
Term Definition
Adversarial system A system typified by involuntary use, little or no user
control, and potentially punitive outcomes.
Countermeasure An action taken to mitigate the effectiveness of a
detection system [9].
Concealed Information
Test (CIT)
A recognition-based criminal interviewing technique
designed to detect a person's guilty knowledge of a
crime (or other topic of interest) [10,11].
Deception A message knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster
a false belief or conclusion by the receiver [12].
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skilled criminal examiners to conduct time-consuming multiphasic in-
terviews with specialized sensors attached to the interviewee. Govern-
ment agencies, private organizations, and researchers are all seeking to
developmore robust, scalable, and automated technological solutions in
response to the limitations of the polygraph [15]. An optimal solution
would be a system capable of conducting an automated non-intrusive
interview measuring behavioral and physiological responses of the in-
terviewee. Responses could be analyzed in real time andused to support
a human decision maker. A wealth of research has already been done
with the aim of creating a system capable of conducting automated de-
ception detection interviews. The following list includes examples of
topics that have already been explored in this context:
• System use for decision support [19,20]
• Incorporation of an automated embodied conversational agent (ECA)
[15]
• Identification and validation of sensors used to collect/interpret
verbal, nonverbal, and physiological responses [16,39–41]
• Identification of an optimal interviewing protocol [42,43]
• Design of an optimal interface and form factor [17,44]
• System acceptance and use by human operators [18]
One of themost important aspects in developing such a system is the
nature and structure of the interaction. Amajority of the studies listed in
the previous paragraph have used the Concealed Information Test (CIT)
as the governing framework for the interaction. The CIT is a recognition-
based criminal interviewing technique utilized sparsely by criminal
examiners and law enforcement agencies [45]. Its limited use persists
despite a wealth of scientific evidence grounded in theoretical support
and extensive empirical testing pointing to its validity [46–48].
In a CIT, groups of stimuli called foils are presented to the examinee
with one stimulus in each foil considered ‘crime-relevant.’ This item is
referred to as the target item. The remaining stimuli in the foil serve as
a baseline of behavior to which responses associated with the target
item can be compared. These stimuli are named non-target items. A
CIT is often comprised of several foils as the statistical likelihood of an
erroneous classification diminishes as the number of foils in-
creases. Electrodermal activity (EDA), or skin conductivity, is the
dominant physiological response measured during a CIT. However,
other measures can be used in conjunction with EDA [10]. The CIT
interview is shorter and more adaptable than a standard polygraph
examination. This makes it a good candidate for automation, espe-
cially with the use of new sensors that can remotely measure be-
havioral and physiological activity [28]. However, the accuracy of
the CIT and other interviewing techniques can be reduced if coun-
termeasures are successfully used by the interviewee. The follow-
ing section provides an overview of various countermeasure
techniques utilized to thwart the polygraph and other deception
detection systems.
2.3. Countermeasures
Psychophysiological deception detection is based on detecting a
physiological response that is linked to psychological processes. For de-
cades, research in deception detection involving the polygraph has in-
vestigated the effectiveness of countermeasures at evading detection
[49,50]. Unfortunately, advances on the part of law enforcement or re-
search have been met by efforts on the part of criminals to circumvent
or thwart those advances. In the case of the polygraph, entire books
andwebsites have been devoted to teaching people how to beat a poly-
graph examination [26].
There are several ways deceivers can increase their chances of pass-
ing a polygraph exam undetected. Polygraph methods center on creat-
ing an individual baseline for truthful responses that is then used to
detect aberrations when the individual is lying. Countermeasures are
generally used tomanipulate the baseline so the baseline and deceptive
responses are indistinguishable. By increasing arousal during truthful
questions, liars are able to muddy their results and receive a truthful
judgment [e.g., 51]. Some of the physical countermeasures studied for
the polygraph are tongue biting [52] and pressing toes against the
floor [50,52]. During a deception detection interaction like the CIT,
countermeasures are employed during the presentation of several
non-relevant items to increase physiological responses, thus reducing
the reliability of the scoring system of these tests.
Mental countermeasures are employed throughout the interview,
rather than just when the baseline questions are asked [51]. Somemen-
tal countermeasures function by increasing the cognitive demands on
deceivers, thus distracting them from the examination and suppressing
their responses [50,51]. One common mental countermeasure of this
type is mental arithmetic. Simply counting backward by 7 from any
large number is an effective method of passing an exam [50]. Other
mental countermeasures are recalling past emotional events [49] or
mentally repeating your name [53].
Of course, the effectiveness of many of these countermeasures is
dependent on the type of the exam and the sensors being used to
detect deception. The vast majority of countermeasures research has
focused on sensors used with the polygraph, including the pneumo-
graph and finger electrodes. As innovative sensors and novel testing
strategies are employed, new types of countermeasures will emerge
in an attempt to circumvent those tests. For example, the P300 is an
electroencephalography-based test using electrical impulses in the
brain to detect the arousal associated with deception. Despite its rela-
tively new development, the effectiveness of countermeasures against
this test has already been established [53,54]. Additionally, functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is being investigated for deception
detection,while research on countermeasures effectiveness proceeds in
parallel [55].
Due to the nature of deception detection, it is clear that the study of
mechanisms to detect deception must proceed hand-in-hand with the
investigation of methods to avoid detection. An approach to deception
detection involving the fusion of multiple non-contact sensors has re-
cently shown promise [15,16]. Previous research on this type of decep-
tion detection has obtained accuracy rates comparable to the polygraph.
A recent investigation of polygraph countermeasures showed limited
effectiveness against a combination of sensors, supporting the multi-
sensor fusion approach to detection [9]. However, the results of that
research were limited to polygraph countermeasures. Because of the
novel nature of this suite of sensors, we must also determine if the use
of new types of countermeasures may allow deceivers to more
effectively evade detection. Furthermore, understanding how certain
variables (e.g., relevant stimuli and system knowledge) influence
countermeasure use is of critical importance to the development and
use of these systems.
3. Theory and hypotheses
Deception is a complicated process, through which one party delib-
erately attempts to manipulate the beliefs of another, often for personal
gain. Many different theories have been proposed to cover the breadth
of phenomena observed during deception. Cognitive load theory pro-
poses, for example, that cues to deception are caused by the increased
cognitive load carried by deceivers who must simultaneously recall
the truth and the deception [56]. Interpersonal deception theory (IDT)
proposes that deception is a complex process involving strategic use
of behaviors by the deceiver in order to appear truthful [56]. These stra-
tegic behaviors are deliberately selected to be congruent with what the
deceiver thinks the target of their deception would be expecting from
someone truthful. In a broader sense, the strategic aspects of deceptive
behavior fall into the category of impression management.
Impression management is the process through which people at-
tempt to control others' impressions of them [57]. In the case of decep-
tion, the deceiver is attempting to create a truthful impression in his or
her targets. Impression management theory breaks down the process
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into two components: impressionmotivation and impression construc-
tion [57]. Impression motivation is the reason the impression manage-
ment takes place. People may have many different reasons and levels
of motivation to manipulate the impressions others have of them. A
job candidate has a strong desire for the interviewer to perceive him or
her as a good fit for the position. A politicianwants to appear trustworthy
and honest when interacting with voters. These motivations cause indi-
viduals in such positions to engage in strategic behaviors of impression
construction in order to engender the desired response from their audi-
ence. Impression construction consists of the verbal andnonverbal behav-
iors associated with creating the desired impression [58].
During a CIT, both guilty and innocent individuals are motivated to
create an impression of innocence. The findings of several studies using
a CIT-based interviewing format confirm that individuals deceiving dur-
ing a systems-based deception detection interaction exhibit strategic be-
haviors in an effort to avoid detection [17,40,43]. The results of these
studies indicate that there are differences between the behavior of de-
ceivers and truth tellers. Specifically, these differences are as follows:
(1) deceivers fixate on the center of the screen longer than truth tellers
[43], (2) deceivers experience longer vocal response latencies relative to
truth tellers [40], and (3) deceivers exhibit increased stimuli avoidance
when questions relevant to their deception are present (even during re-
peat screenings) [17]. In order to counter natural responses to deception,
individualsmay engage in deliberate countermeasures. If the individual is
in an unknown situation or examination, these countermeasures are
termed spontaneous countermeasures [59]. Both guilty and innocent
people can and do engage in spontaneous countermeasures [59]. Howev-
er, the impression motivation should be much stronger in guilty individ-
uals because they have both a more difficult task and more at stake if the
test classifies them as deceptive. We propose the following hypothesis:
H1. Participants with guilty knowledge have a higher propensity to use
countermeasures than those without guilty knowledge.
It is important to note that the deception literature referenced
previously is based on experiments in which deceivers are presented
with stimuli relevant to their deception. Relevant stimuli are pre-
sented as ameans of triggering behavioral or physiological responses
indicative of deceit. A hindrance to effective CIT interviewing is the
necessity to identify relevant target items that can trigger deception
indicators [28]. What has yet to be explored is the presence of behav-
ioral differences between deceivers who are exposed to relevant
stimuli and those who are not exposed to relevant stimuli. This
issue is of critical importance for practical reasons, as persons com-
pleting real-life screening interviews could be deceiving but may
not encounter relevant questions during the interaction, and thereby
appear truthful.
It is the contention of this research that deceivers who are not
exposed to relevant stimuli will continue to act strategically in order
to appear truthful, thus differentiating themselves from truth tellers.
However, the propensity for persons not exposed to relevant stimuli
to act strategically will not be as persistent as persons encountering rel-
evant stimuli. This contention is grounded in defensive response theory,
often referred to as the fight-or-flight response [60], which states that a
person's perception of threatening stimuli will result in a defensive
behavior (i.e., a reaction to the threat) [61,62]. This sequence can be
broken into three distinct components: a perceived threat, a defensive
reflex, and a form of behavior modification [17]. Relevant literature in-
vestigating automated deception detection screening systems has stat-
ed that “defensive behaviors are driven by a perceived threat and
therefore can be different frombehavioral reactions to stimuli perceived
to be non-threatening” [17,63]. In the context of using an automated
system to identify deception, a sender of deceptive messages will be
much more threatened by the system if the system presents stimuli
that are relevant to the user's deception. This increase in perceived
threat will trigger defensive responses (i.e., the use of strategic
behaviors designed to mitigate the system). The following hypothesis
is proposed:
H2. Participants seeing relevant stimuli have a higher propensity to use
countermeasures than participants who do not see relevant stimuli.
Furthermore, experience with a system can change the way a user
views and uses a system [64]. Substantial experience with an adversar-
ial system may decrease the effectiveness of the system (i.e., reduce its
ability to detect deception) as users become more confident using the
system [9]. At point is the difference between experiencewith a system
and knowledge about a system. For example, a usermay have little expe-
riencewith a system (i.e., never participated in a deception detection in-
terview), yet know a lot about how a system works by reading about it
online [26]. Usersmay also lack experience and knowledge about how a
system works. However, as participants gain knowledge about the sys-
tem, their behavior is likely to change, regardless of whether they have
anything to hide. The Hawthorne Effect proposes that the mere act of
observationmaymodify behavior [65,66]. In the case of a deception de-
tection system, that behavioral modification should manifest itself by
increasing behaviors (i.e., countermeasures) the system views as inno-
cent, and decreasing those viewed as guilty [67]. Accordingly, the fol-
lowing hypothesis is proposed:
H3. Participants with knowledge of the system have a higher propensi-
ty to use countermeasures than participants without that knowledge.
The effect of system knowledge on countermeasure use is expected
to be stronger for participants in the guilty condition.Without any guilty
knowledge, participants have marginal emotional investment in the
outcome of the interview, or in the functioning of the system, and
thus low impression motivation. Without impression motivation, sys-
tem knowledge should have a minimal effect on impression construc-
tion behaviors. With guilty knowledge, however, participants can be
expected to use their knowledge of the system and of their crime to de-
vise countermeasures to improve their chances of being deemed inno-
cent. In this way both the impression motivation and the impression
construction processes are affected. The following hypothesis is
proposed:
H4. System knowledge strengthens the relationship between guilty
knowledge and countermeasure use.
The complete research model for this study is presented in Fig. 1.
4. Methodology
Two laboratory experiments were conducted to test the specified
hypotheses. Participants from both studies were undergraduate stu-
dents recruited from business courses at a large western university.
No participant reported any previous experiencewith law enforcement,
criminal investigations, or deception detection. One participant report-
ed hearing information about the experiment prior to participating;
data from that participant were discarded. The average age of partici-
pants in the first study (N = 77) was 23.7 years; 78.1 percent were
male. The average age of participants in the second study (N = 114)
was 21.2 years; fifty-seven percent weremale. Three experimental ma-
nipulationswere used to test the hypotheses: (1) the presence or lack of
guilty knowledge in system users, (2) the system's inclusion or
omission of relevant stimuli during the interaction, and (3) the user
being aware or unaware of the capabilities/functionality of the system.
Refer to Table 2 for a concise overview of the treatments constituting
our experimental design.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the possible condi-
tions outlined in Table 2. Participants in the control groups were told
to pack a bagwith benign items and pass through a screening interview.
Control group members possessed no knowledge of any criminal activ-
ity and had no reason to deceive. Guilty knowledgewasmanipulated by
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having members of the three manipulation groups smuggle a banned
item through the screening interview. Participants in the
manipulation groups were instructed that they were associates of a
well-known criminal enterprise operating in the area. They were
given instructions to pack the bag and deliver it to one of three possible
criminal collaborators waiting for them in the atrium of the business
school building. Participants were shown pictures of the collaborators
and told to memorize their faces so that they could successfully hand
off the bag to the correct individual once their task was complete. One
of the items they were told to place in the bag was a simulated impro-
vised explosive device (IED, see Fig. 2). Clothing, books, and other
items were provided to help conceal the IED in the bag. The IED, the
faces of the criminal collaborators, and the name of the criminal organi-
zation would serve as the guilty knowledge that manipulation group
members would have to conceal to pass the screening interview
(i.e., they were used as target items during the CIT).
After packing the bag, all participants continued to the screening
area. Upon entering the screening area, participants were led by one
of the researchers to an interviewing kiosk (see Fig. 3) and positioned
in front of it. Participants were instructed to place their bag on the
floor next to the kiosk during the interview. The interviewing kiosk
consisted of a computer monitor and several sensors attached to a cen-
tral computer. The height of the computer screen was adjusted to ac-
count for the height of each participant. To manipulate system
knowledge, participants in the second study were informed about the
format of the interview (a CIT) and the measurement capabilities of its
sensors. Participants given system knowledge were specifically told
that they would be presented with images of faces, banned items, and
thenames of criminal organizations. Theywere further told that the sys-
tem would be measuring their eye movements and speech while they
viewed these images. This information was conveyed to participants
prior to the deception detection interview by displaying a series of
seven slides on the screen (listed in Table 3 as ‘Automated Overview
of System Functionality’).
During the CIT, several foils of image groups appeared on the screen.
Each foil contained image groups of either faces, banned items, or the
names of criminal organizations. Refer to Fig. 4 for an example of an
image group of banned items displayed by the system during one of
the foils. For each of the image groups presented, participants were
asked the same question: “Are you familiar with any of these faces/
items/criminal organizations?” Participants were required to respond
verbally to each question by stating “Yes” or “No”. The presence or
lack of relevant stimuli was manipulated by configuring the set of
images displayed during each interaction. An interaction containing
relevant stimuli consisted of images of the IED, the three criminal
collaborators, and the name of the criminal organization all appearing
randomly during the interaction. The set of non-relevant stimuli
contained face, banned item, and criminal organization images not
relevant to the mock crime.
After completing the interview, participants were informed that the
bag did not need to be delivered to the criminal collaborators. Partici-
pants were then ushered into a separate room to take a post-test survey
wherein they answered questions about their experience during the in-
terview. It was during this survey that participants reported on their
behavior and the use of countermeasures during the interaction. Each
participant was asked if he or she used any tactics to appear truthful.
If the participant answered in the affirmative, they were asked to iden-
tify the countermeasures that they employed.
There were no significant differences between the procedures in the
first and second studies aside from the intended manipulations. The
differences in experimental conditions for each group are summarized
in Table 3. Bolded items indicate how eachmanipulation group differed
from the control group.
5. Results
The frequencies of self-reported countermeasure use associated
with the three manipulations employed in this research are as follows:
guilty knowledge (49.2%), no guilty knowledge (14.5%), relevant stimuli
(53.2%), no relevant stimuli (25.0%), system knowledge (44.7%), and no
system knowledge (24.7%) (depicted in Table 4). The percentage of
participants using countermeasures in the no guilty knowledge group,
who had no motivation to deceive, was surprisingly high (14.5%).
To test H1 through H3, a multiple logistic regression model using
multiple predictors wasfitted to the data to test the occurrence of coun-
termeasures. The outcome variable was countermeasure use (1 = yes,
0 = no), and the predictors were guilty knowledge (1 = yes, 0 = no),
system knowledge (1 = yes, 0 = no), and relevant stimuli (1 = yes,
0 = no). A multiple logistic regression test was chosen because all of
Fig. 1. Research model.
Table 2
Experiment manipulations.
Study 1 Study 2
Control Group 1 Control Group 2
Guilty Knowledge: No Guilty Knowledge: No
Relevant Stimuli: No Relevant Stimuli: No
System Knowledge: No System Knowledge: Yes
Manipulation Group 1 Manipulation Group 2A
Guilty Knowledge: Yes Guilty Knowledge: Yes
Relevant Stimuli: Yes Relevant Stimuli: Yes
System Knowledge: No System Knowledge: Yes
Manipulation Group 2B
Guilty Knowledge: Yes
Relevant Stimuli: No
System Knowledge: Yes
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the independent variables and the dependent variable are dichotomous.
The minimum sample size for a multiple logistic regression is 10 cases
per independent variable [68] and it does not assume normality, linear-
ity, or homoscedasticity [69]. Results from a power analysis (α= 0.05,
power = 0.80, odds ratio = 2.6, and medium effect size) indicate that
the minimum sample size is 117. This study has a sample size of 191,
resulting in power = 0.94.
The results shown in Table 5 indicate significant support for H1
(Wald's χ2 = 3.891, p = 0.049). Participants with guilty knowledge
were 2.6 times more likely to use countermeasures than participants
without. Support was also found for H2 (Wald's χ2 = 5.905, p =
0.015). Participants exposed to relevant stimuli were 2.9 times more
likely to use countermeasures than participants who were not exposed
to relevant stimuli. H3 was also supported (Wald's χ2 = 8.737, p =
0.003), as participants with knowledge of the system were 3.3 times
more likely to use countermeasures than participants without. The
specified logistic regression model exhibited good fit against the data
(Cox and Snell R2 = 0.170. Nagelkerke R2 = 0.232).
To test H4, scores for guilty knowledge and system knowledge were
standardized by calculating z-scores for each. These standardized scores
were then multiplied together to create the moderating variable. The
moderating variable was then added to the existingmodel. Results indi-
cate no support for H4. Addition of the moderating variable had no
substantial effect on the amount of variance explained by the model.
Cox and Snell R2 changed from R2 = 0.170 to R2 = 0.172, and
Nagelkerke R2 changed from R2 = 0.232 to R2 = 0.235. Results also in-
dicate that the variable itself was not a significant predictor in themodel
(Wald's χ2 = 0.530, p = 0.467, β=−0.335, SE β= 0.460). Thus, we
find that system knowledge did not strengthen the relationship
between guilty knowledge and countermeasure use. The results from
hypothesis testing are summarized in Table 6.
In addition to the formal hypotheses summarized in Table 6, post-
hoc exploratory analysis was done on the type and variety of counter-
measures reported in Study 2 in an effort to better understand how
countermeasures are used by each experimental group. Countermea-
sures were categorized to group similar measures together; ultimately,
ten categories were formed with one category labeled ‘Other’ for coun-
termeasures used by only one participant. A listing of the category
names, each with an accompanying description, is provided in Table 7.
When participants learned about the functionality of the deception
detection system they were told that the system would be monitoring
their eye movements and speech. Five of the ten categories listed in
Table 7 describe manipulations of eye behavior, namely: blurred view-
ing, center of screen, consistent viewing, equal viewing, and haphazard
viewing. Only two of the ten categories are associated with speech, spe-
cifically: temporal response control and tone control. It is interesting to
note that some participants reported using physiological pain manipu-
lation (e.g., pinching oneself to elicit a fabricated physiological re-
sponse); this type of tactic is often employed to thwart the accuracy of
sensors used for polygraph interviews.
The relative use of each countermeasure was calculated for each
condition; an aggregate value for all three conditions combined was
also calculated. Refer to Table 8 for a listing of these values and a graph-
ical representation in Fig. 5. The most frequently used countermeasure
in any condition was the use of equal viewing behavior employed by
participants in the control group. Members of the control group largely
used eye-based countermeasures but also had the highest percentage
of countermeasures allocated to the ‘Other’ category. ‘Consistent View-
ing’ is the highest-scoring category for both manipulation groups. The
participants with guilty knowledge who did not see relevant stimuli
had the most variety in the types of countermeasures that were used,
Fig. 2. Simulated explosive device packed by participants in the manipulation groups.
Fig. 3. Interviewing kiosk.
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while participants with guilty knowledge who did see relevant stimuli
primarily employed eye-based and voice-based countermeasures.
6. Discussion
This research looked at variations in behavior that occur when users
interact with an adversarial deception detection system. These varia-
tions manifested as countermeasures. Countermeasures were expected
to increase in response to the following three manipulations: (1) the
presence of guilty knowledge in systemusers, (2) the system's inclusion
of relevant stimuli during the interaction, and (3) the user being aware
of the functionality of the system. The results of this research make
important contributions to a variety of research streams. We discuss
the implications of these contributions, along with limitations and
avenues for future research, in the following sections.
6.1. Implications for research
The hypothesis test for H1 revealed that participants possessing
guilty knowledge had a higher propensity to use countermeasures
(2.6 times) than truth tellers. Forty-nine percent of participants with
guilty knowledge used countermeasures; thus, the effect of guilt or
attempted concealment on countermeasure use was substantial. How-
ever, fifteen percent of participants lacking a need to be deceptive also
used countermeasures. This finding reveals a substantial pitfall associat-
ed with trying to use the presence of countermeasures as a means of
identifying deceivers. Further, this finding supports the impressionmo-
tivation component of deception. Even innocent participants have some
motivation to appear innocent, and thus employed impression con-
struction techniques to create the impression of truthfulness. Based on
the results of this study, it can be inferred that some users will actively
try to circumvent any adversarial system, even if they are innocent.
Researchers and system designers must account for these attempts at
circumvention when developing deception detection systems.
Formulating interactions and sets of interview questions that are
constituted of information relevant to a past crime is one of the most
challenging aspects of identifying deception [10,28]. Past research stud-
ies have had distinct truthful and deceptive groups to simplify the re-
search design and clearly quantify the ability of the system to
effectively identify deception [9,15,16]. This research included a treat-
ment in which deceivers were not asked by the system about their de-
ception. This manipulation (tested by H2) was an effort to reveal how
Fig. 4. Sample slide containing banned items.
Table 3
Experimental task steps by condition.
Control (Studies 1 & 2) No relevant stimuli (Study 2) Relevant stimuli (Studies 1 & 2)
1. Pre-test survey
2. Pack bag with benign items
3. Went to screening area
4. Automated overview of system functionality
(Study 2)
5. Interview at kiosk
6. Asked if they were familiar with items shown
7. Shown generic faces, benign items, and generic names
8. Told bag did not need to be delivered
9. Post-test survey
1. Pre-test survey
2. Pack bag with items
a. Will deliver bag to criminal collaborators
b. Shown faces of collaborators
c. Told activities were associated with drug cartel
d. Placed simulated IED in bag with other items
3. Went to screening area
4. Automated overview of system functionality (Study 2)
5. Interview at kiosk
6. Asked if they were familiar with items shown
7. Shown generic faces, benign items, and generic names
8. Told bag did not need to be delivered
9. Post-test survey
1. Pre-test survey
2. Pack bag with items
a. Will deliver bag to criminal collaborators
b. Shown faces of collaborators
c. Told activities were associated with drug cartel
d. Placed simulated IED in bag with other items
3. Went to screening area
4. Automated overview of system functionality (Study 2)
5. Interview at kiosk
6. Asked if they were familiar with items shown
7. Shown faces of waiting criminals, picture of the IED,
and name of the drug cartel
8. Told bag did not need to be delivered
9. Post-test survey
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the presence of relevant questions influences user behavior. In congru-
ence with defensive response theory, H2 was supported as participants
presented with threatening/relevant stimuli were more likely to use be-
havior modifications/countermeasures (2.9 times) than participants
who were not presented with relevant stimuli during the interaction.
Fifty-three percent of participants shown relevant items used counter-
measures. Surprisingly, twenty-five percent of participants who were
not shown relevant items still used countermeasures. This result demon-
strates that deception detection systems are effective at eliciting counter-
measure use even if stimuli relevant to the deception are not shown.
Exploratory analysis of the data indicated that the types of countermea-
sures used by members of each experimental group was quite different.
Accordingly, an analysis focusing on the types of countermeasures used
could provide a means of differentiating between truthful and deceptive
individuals.
Third, prior research has looked at how experience with a system
changes how a user interacts with and uses that system [4,6,70]. This
research demonstrates that the mere knowledge of how a deception
detection system works, even with no prior experience, significantly
changes how users interact with the system. Knowledge of how a
deception detection system works may reduce its effectiveness. The
significant test for H3 supports prior findings. Providing users with
knowledge about the deception detection system led to an increase in
countermeasure use by deceivers from twenty-five percent to forty-
five percent. More knowledge of how a systemworkswill lead to signif-
icantly greater attempts (3.3 times) to circumvent the system. Results
from this study show that when studying deception detection systems,
or other types of adversarial systems, effort must be taken to under-
stand the impact of users' knowledge of the system on the study's
results. Performing research using only participants with little or no
knowledge of the system may inadvertently harm the external validity
of the study. With regard to adversarial systems, it is reasonable to
believe that users may seek out information about the system before
using it (e.g., buy a book on how to pass a lie detector test before an
assessment [26]). It is also likely that information about the system
will be disseminated to the public. As such, simulating interviewee
knowledge of the system in a laboratory setting will yield more ecolog-
ically valid data and result in a system that is more robust and ready for
use in real-world applications.
H4 was not supported as there was no moderating effect of system
knowledge on the relationship between guilty knowledge and counter-
measure use.While both guilty knowledge and system knowledge have
significant direct effects (H1 and H3 respectively), having prior knowl-
edge about the system did not strengthen the relationship between
guilty knowledge and countermeasure use. Researchers looking at re-
peated use of adversarial systems (i.e., biannual polygraph exams) can
be confident that prior knowledge about the system will not differen-
tially affect countermeasure use among participants with guilty
knowledge.
Finally, this study serves as a reminder that experimental partici-
pants are not passive observers, or even passive participants in any in-
teractive sense. This is illustrated by the fact that a sizeable portion of
members of the control group utilized countermeasures despite having
no information to conceal or need to be deceptive. Just as survey ques-
tions or observation canmodify behavior [65,66,71], so too can themea-
surement of behavior in sensor-driven studies. Researchers must
consider the implications of their measurement and understand that
members in all treatments (including the control group) are influenced
by the very act of being measured, thereby potentially dampening the
generalizability of empirical work to the real world.
6.2. Implications for practice
The results of this study offer several valuable insights for practice.
First, we find that while participants with guilty knowledge are more
likely to use countermeasures, there is still a strong percentage of inno-
cent peoplewho employed countermeasures. This effect ismagnified by
the introduction of system knowledge. For the deployment of automat-
ed deception detection systems in the field, it is important to consider
how people will react to the system when they know what is being
measured. It would be unrealistic to assume naïveté on the part of all
persons who interact with a system, even among those who are inno-
cent. Out of curiosity it is possible, even likely, that an interested person
may investigate the technology behind a deception detection system.
System designersmust understand this and incorporate it into the algo-
rithms they employ. For example, attempting to view all items on the
screen consistently could be a countermeasure employed either due to
deception or because an innocent person presumes that is the expected
innocent behavior. Themere detection of employed countermeasures is
not sufficient to establish deception.
Additionally, the exploratory analyses confirm that participants
employed an extensive set of countermeasures during the interview,
many ofwhichhave not beenpreviously identified or reported in extant
literature and are thus considered novel. These countermeasures varied
by experimental condition. For example, twenty-eight percent of the
countermeasures used by the control group consisted of equal viewing,
but only five percent of the countermeasures used by the group not ex-
posed to relevant stimuli consisted of equal viewing. Similarly, nineteen
percent of the countermeasures used by the group not exposed to rele-
vant stimuli were attempts at vocal temporal response control, but the
control group reported zero attempts at vocal temporal response con-
trol. Practitioners both developing and using new forms of deception
detection systems need to account for the inevitability that new types
of countermeasures will constantly be developed and employed by
users, regardless of how novel the systems or sensors used for data col-
lection may be.
6.3. Limitations and avenues for future research
One of the contributions of this research is the investigation of how
knowledge of a screening system affects countermeasure use. Providing
Table 4
Countermeasure use.
Used countermeasure? Total sample (N) Guilty knowledge No guilty knowledge Relevant stimuli No relevant stimuli System knowledge No system knowledge
Yes 70 60 10 42 28 51 19
No 121 62 59 37 84 63 58
Summary 191 122 69 79 112 114 77
Percent used CM 36.6% 49.2% 14.5% 53.2% 25.0% 44.7% 24.7%
Table 5
Logistic regression analysis of countermeasure use for H1-H3.
Predictor β SE β Wald's
χ2
df p eβ
(Odds ratio)
Constant −2.462 0.433 30.91 1 b0.001 0.059
Guilty Knowledge 0.953 0.483 3.891 1 0.049 2.593
Relevant Stimuli 1.081 0.445 5.905 1 0.015 2.947
System Knowledge 1.181 0.4 8.737 1 0.003 3.258
Test Wald's χ2 df p
Overall model evaluation 35.507 3 b0.001
Note: Cox and Snell R2 = 0.170. Nagelkerke R2 = 0.232.
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participants with knowledge of a deception detection system in a labo-
ratory setting could be perceived as a limitation of the study as system
knowledge could alter user perceptions and behavior. However, it is
our contention that increasing system knowledge improves realism
and generalizability as the use of these systems in the real world
would result in public knowledge concerning their operations. In light
of this inevitability, research investigating how users interact with
screening systems when they are aware of their operations should
help to bridge the ecological validity gap between laboratory and real-
world interactions. It is also worth noting that providing an overview
of the CIT interview format/sensors prior to the administration of a tra-
ditional CIT is a standard protocol [10]. Adopting this protocol in an au-
tomated screening system context more closely adheres to CIT best
practices (a practice largely ignored in prior automated screening re-
search). It should be noted that additional knowledge and experience
with the system might reduce the effectiveness of the system as users
become more comfortable and confident in their ability to manipulate
the system. Additional studies looking at repeated exposure to the
deception detection system and the CIT are warranted.
Relatedly, this study is limited somewhat by the use of a mock crime
experimental task with student participants rather than real criminals.
While there are certainly differences between a student participant
smuggling a banned item in a laboratory and a criminal smuggling
illegal contraband through an actual law enforcement checkpoint, this
limitation may not be as impactful as it initially seems. Throughout
the history of the study of deception, laboratory experiments have
been used as proxies for criminal interviews to understand the mecha-
nisms behind deception and its detection [72–74]. Questions are often
raised about the validity of these experiments when generalizing to
real-world applications [73,75]. Several studies comparing field studies
to well-designed laboratory experiments have found the results to be
generalizable [75,76], and deception effects have even been shown to
be greater (and thus more easily detectable) in the field than in a labo-
ratory [75]. Thus, the results of mock crime experiments may be gener-
alized to a broader context, though further study will be required to
confirm the model with a sample from the field [73].
Future research should also examine the impact of countermeasures
found in this study on the accuracy of automated deception detection
systems. The exploratory part of Study 2 found that the type and quan-
tity of countermeasure use varied across experimental conditions. A
separate study will be required tomore fully explore how andwhy spe-
cific countermeasures are used by truthful and deceptive users engaged
in a deception detection interaction. Furthermore, the impact of individ-
ual countermeasures on Type I and Type II errorswill provide a rich area
of study. Depending on the application of a system (e.g., border screen-
ing), an increase in misclassifications could prove to be a limiting factor
in the system's real-world capabilities. It is, however, doubtful that an
automated screening systemwill be used to remove humans complete-
ly from the decision-making process. Rather, a successive hurdles
approach could be used wherein an automated system provides an ini-
tial classification, and a human passes the final judgment. Additionally,
previous research has examined polygraph-style mental and physical
countermeasures in a CIT [9], but the effectiveness of the spontaneous
countermeasures employed by participants in this experiment would
require further study.
Finally, while the operationalization of this research focused on user
interactions with an automated deception detection system, the broader
context of this work is the exploration of user interactions with adversar-
ial systems. The lion's share of technology adoption and use research as-
sumes cooperation between system and user, however, new systems
and novel interaction formats are creating exceptions to this traditional
view. Within the context of interaction with an adversarial system there
is no system adoption. The ways users interact with adversarial systems
are fundamentally different from the ways users interact with traditional
information systems. Instead of wanting to use the system to improve
their own productivity or achieve an objective, users may choose to ac-
tively work against an adversarial system. In other words, the behavioral
intention may be to circumvent the system, not to use the system. This
Table 6
Hypothesis results.
Hypothesis Wald's χ2 P Outcome
H1 Participants with guilty knowledge have a higher propensity to use countermeasures than those without guilty knowledge. 3.891 0.049 Accept⁎
H2 Participants seeing relevant stimuli have a higher propensity to use countermeasures than participants who do not see relevant stimuli. 5.905 0.015 Accept⁎
H3 Participants with knowledge of the system have a higher propensity to use countermeasures than participants without that knowledge. 8.737 0.003 Accept⁎⁎
H4 System knowledge strengthens the relationship between guilty knowledge and countermeasure use. 0.53 0.467 Reject
⁎ Significant at p b 0.05.
⁎⁎ Significant at p b 0.01.
Table 7
Post-hoc categorization of countermeasures.
Countermeasure
category
Description
Blurred viewing Blurring eyes to avoid viewing any of the images on the
screen.
Center of screen Averting eye gaze from images and fixating on the center
of the screen.
Consistent viewing Using the same pattern of viewing images for each slide
(e.g., looking at the image in the top-left quadrant first,
then looking at the image in the top-right quadrant, etc.).
Emotion control Attempting to control emotional states to avoid detection
(e.g., acting calm or bored during the interview).
Equal viewing Attempting to view each image on a slide for an equal
duration.
Haphazard viewing Using a variety of viewing patterns during the interview.
Ignoring interview Zoning out during the interview in an effort to avoid
viewing stimuli.
Physiological pain
manipulation
Inflicting pain on oneself to fabricate physiological
responses.
Temporal response
control
Attempting to match vocal response latency for each
response.
Tone control Attempting to use the same tone for each vocal response.
Other Tactics comprising this category include: averting eye gaze
from target stimuli, attempting to control facial
expressions, controlling eye blinks, attempting to forget
target items, and matching head movements to verbal
responses.
Table 8
Percentage of use for each countermeasure type (by condition).
Type Countermeasure All NGK +
NRS
GK +
NRS
GK +
RS
Visual Blurred viewing 3% 0% 0% 6%
Center of screen 9% 9% 10% 9%
Consistent viewing 20% 18% 22% 20%
Equal viewing 14% 28% 5% 15%
Haphazard viewing 6% 9% 0% 9%
Ignoring interview 3% 0% 10% 0%
Vocal Temporal response control 11% 0% 19% 9%
Tone control 12% 9% 5% 17%
Emotional Emotion control 9% 9% 14% 6%
Physiological Physiological pain manipulation 5% 0% 5% 6%
Other Other 8% 18% 10% 3%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Note: NGK + NRS = No guilty knowledge + no relevant stimuli; GK + NRS = guilty
knowledge + no relevant stimuli; GK + RS = guilty knowledge + relevant stimuli.
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shift requires a new theoretical understanding of how users will perceive
such systems and how users will choose to interact with such systems.
Future research can build on this work to help illuminate technology
use when the goals of the system and the user are in opposition.
7. Conclusion
The advancement of technology is resulting in a preponderance of
new devices and systems that can be used in entirely novel ways. One
such area is the introduction of systems and sensors that can be used to
measure user behavior and physiology in an interaction not instigated
or wanted by the user. Such adversarial systems are typified by involun-
tary use, little or no user control, and potentially punitive outcomes. The
purpose of this research was to investigate user behavior in such a con-
text; this context was operationalized using a deception detection inter-
action leveraging an automated interviewing system. Theoretically-
grounded hypotheses were specified and two laboratory studies were
performed to measure the influence of the following three variables on
theuse of behavioral countermeasures: (1) guilty knowledge, (2) relevant
stimuli, and (3) system knowledge. Analysis of the data revealed that
guilty knowledge, exposure to relevant stimuli during the system interac-
tion, and increased systemknowledgebefore the interaction all contribut-
ed to the use of countermeasures. These findings have important
implications for researchers and practitioners (1) developing deception
detection systems and (2) seeking to better understand how users inter-
act with adversarial systems.
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